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whether	 and	 how	 those	 discussions	 have	 changed	 over	 time.	 More	
*	Associate	Professor	 of	 Law	and	Director,	 Institute	 on	 the	 Supreme	Court	 of	 the	United	 States
(ISCOTUS),	IIT	Chicago‐Kent	College	of	Law.	I	would	like	to	thank	Christopher	Schmidt	and	Jerry	
Thomas,	 as	well	 as	 participants	 in	 the	University	 of	 Chicago’s	 Judicial	 Behavior	Workshop	 and	
participants	of	a	Chicago‐Kent	 faculty	workshop	 for	 their	helpful	comments	and	suggestions	on	
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to	 congressional	 appropriations	 committees	 to	 discuss	 the	 Court’s	 budget.	 As	 Jason	 Mazzone	
pointed	 out	 at	 the	 live	 Symposium	 at	 which	 this	 paper	 was	 presented,	 see	









CALDEIRA,	 CITIZENS,	 COURTS,	 AND	 CONFIRMATIONS:	 POSITIVITY	 THEORY	 AND	 THE	 JUDGMENTS	 OF	 THE	
AMERICAN	PEOPLE	71	 (2009);	see	also	Geoffrey	R.	 Stone,	Understanding	Supreme	Court	Confirma‐
tions,	 2010	 SUP.	 CT.	 REV.	 381,	 449	 (2011)	 (describing	 intense	media	 coverage	 in	 contemporary	
confirmation	hearings).	




cise	 and	 when	 they	 acknowledge	 the	 inevitable	 role	 of	 subjective	
judgment.3	
This	question	 is	particularly	 timely.	 In	 the	 four	most	 recent	 con‐
firmation	 hearings,	 those	 for	 Chief	 Justice	 Roberts	 and	 Justices	 Alito,	
Sotomayor,	 and	 Kagan,	 nominees	 and	 senators	 alike	 frequently	 de‐





plaining	 that	 judges	 “apply	 law	 to	 facts.	 We	 don’t	 apply	 feelings	 to	





United	 States	Before	 the	 S.	Comm.	on	 the	 Judiciary,	 111th	 Cong.	 202	 (2010)	 (response	 of	 Elena	











5. Confirmation	 Hearing	 on	 the	 Nomination	 of	 Hon.	 Sonia	 Sotomayor	 to	 be	 an	 Associate
Justice	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	the	United	States	Before	the	S.	Comm.	on	the	Judiciary,	111th	Cong.	
121	(2009)	(response	of	J.	Sonia	Sotomayor	to	Sen.	Jon	Kyl,	S.	Comm.	on	the	Judiciary).	
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wisdom	 and	 empirical	 studies	 illustrate	 that	 ideology	 “affect[s]	 who	




on	 the	 Judiciary)	 (promising	 to	 “interpret,”	 and	 not	 “make”	 law);	 Confirmation	Hearing	 on	 the	
Nomination	of	Hon.	Samuel	A.	Alito,	Jr.	to	be	an	Associate	Justice	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	the	United	




Sen.	Al	Franken,	S.	Comm.	on	the	 Judiciary)	(noting	 that	Congress	makes	 the	 law	and	the	Court	
must	apply	the	law).	
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over	time.13	Nor	is	it	a	secret	from	the	American	public.	When	the	cur‐
rent	 Supreme	 Court	 actually	 decides	 cases,	 many	 of	 those	 cases	 are	
decided	by	narrow	votes,	with	four	“conservative”	justices	on	one	side,	





made	 about	 judging	 during	 confirmation	 hearings	 and	much	 of	what	
the	public	sees	once	the	new	justice	takes	his	or	her	seat	on	the	Court.	
In	this	paper,	 I	examine	part	of	that	disconnect.	Specifically,	 I	ex‐
plore	 what	 nominees	 say	 about	 judging	 during	 their	 confirmation	








October	 Term	 2011,	 (June	 30,	 2012),	 http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp‐
content/uploads/2012/06/SB_five‐to‐four_OT11_final.pdf.	 Of	 course,	 Justice	 Kennedy	 is	 not	
always	the	swing	vote.	A	notable	and	surprising	recent	instance	in	which	he	was	not	is	National	
Federation	of	Independent	Business	v.	Sebelius,	132	S.	Ct.	2566	(2012),	the	remarkably	high‐profile	
challenge	 to	 the	 Patient	 Protection	 and	Affordable	 Care	 Act.	 In	 that	 case,	 Chief	 Justice	 Roberts	











question‐in‐health‐care‐law/2012/03/26/gIQAkyKWdS_story.html	 (describing	 reactions	 and	
questioning	of	“conservative”	and	“liberal”	justices	during	the	oral	arguments	in	National	Federa‐
tion	 of	 Independent	Business,	 132	 S.	 Ct.	 2566	 (2012));	 Sheryl	 Gay	 Stolberg,	 Future	 of	 an	Aging	




2008),	 http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/29/nation/na‐scotus29	 (assessing	 October	 Term	
2007	by	discussing	in	which	cases	the	conservative	bloc	prevailed	and	in	which	the	liberals	won).	
There	are,	of	course,	a	substantial	number	of	cases	that	evidence	non‐ideological	voting,	whether	
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hearings	 and	 consider	 how	 those	 statements	might	 affect	Americans’	
view	of	the	Court	as	an	institution.	Ultimately,	I	consider	whether	and	
how	those	statements—in	particular	the	disparity	between	ubiquitous	
claims	 of	 neutrality	 and	 objectivity	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	 the	 rarer	
acknowledgements	of	 the	role	 for	subjective	 judgment	on	the	other	–
might	affect	the	legitimacy	of	the	Court.	
The	paper	proceeds	in	three	parts.	In	Part	I,	I	provide	some	back‐
ground	 on	 Supreme	 Court	 confirmation	 hearings	 and	 nominations,17	
on	some	of	the	empirical	research	that	has	already	been	done,	and	on	
the	reasons	that	the	particular	question	I	pursue	here	is	important.	In	
Part	 II,	 I	 describe	my	 empirical	 investigation	 into	 nominee	 claims	 of	




connect	 between	 the	 confirmation	 hearing	 rhetoric	 of	 objectivity	 or	






on	 Supreme	 Court	 nominations	 without	 any	 public	 hearings	 at	 all.19	
Even	after	hearings	began	to	be	held,	no	nominee	testified	before	the	
Judiciary	 Committee	 until	 Harlan	 Fiske	 Stone	 in	 1925.20	 And	 after	
17.	 Throughout	this	Article,	I	rely	on	background	data	collected	and	made	publicly	available
by	 Lee	 Epstein,	 et	 al.,	 U.S.	 Supreme	 Court	 Justices	 Database,	 available	 at	
http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/justicesdata.html.	 This	 database	 contains	 an	
enormous	 amount	 of	 information	 about	 every	 individual	 nominated	 to	 the	 Supreme	 Court	
(through	Justice	Sotomayor),	whether	or	not	that	individual	was	ultimately	confirmed.	
18.	 That	 there	 were	 no	 hearings	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 the	 Senate	 automatically	 confirmed
whoever	the	President	nominated.	To	the	contrary,	“from	1790	to	1900,	the	Senate	confirmed	69	
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Stone’s	 testimony,	such	appearances	remained	extremely	rare	 for	 the	
next	thirty	years.	
Since	 1955,	 however,	 an	 appearance	 before	 the	 Senate	 Judiciary	
Committee	 has	 been	 expected	 of	 every	 nominee,21	 and	 since	 1955	 a	
total	 of	 thirty	 Supreme	 Court	 confirmation	 hearings,	 for	 thirty	 nomi‐
nees,	have	been	held.	Ten	of	these	nominees	were	nominated	by	Dem‐
ocratic	 presidents	 and	 twenty	 by	Republican	presidents.22	Out	 of	 the	




Democratic	 nominees	 were	 made	 to	 Democratic‐controlled	 Senates,	
and	 only	 five	 Republican	 nominees	 were	made	 to	 a	 Republican	 Sen‐
ate.24	
Not	 all	 confirmation	 hearings	 are	 the	 same.	 Historically,	 some	
nominees	were	asked	virtually	no	questions.	Justice	Whittaker’s	public	
testimony	 at	 his	 1957	 confirmation	 hearing	 takes	 up	 precisely	 three	
pages	 of	 transcript.25	 Even	 some	 of	 the	 more	 controversial	 nomina‐
tions,	 such	 as	 President	 Johnson’s	 nomination	 of	 Thurgood	Marshall,	
featured	only	a	 relatively	small	number	of	 senators	asking	questions.	
Marshall	was	 interrogated	at	 length,	but	primarily	by	only	 four	sena‐
tors–three	of	them	Southern	Democrats	and	all	of	them	ardent	segre‐
gationists.26	 Beginning	 in	 1981,	 however,	 with	 Justice	 O’Connor’s	
Supreme	Court	Nominees,	1939‐2009,	60	AM.	U.	L.	REV.	589,	594	(2011)	(citing	History	of	the	Senate	
Committee	 on	 the	 Judiciary,	 U.S.	 SENATE	 COMM.	 ON	 THE	 JUDICIARY,	
http://judiciary.senate.gove/about/history/index.cfm).	 “In	 1939,	 Felix	 Frankfurter	 became	 the	
first	nominee	to	take	unrestricted	questions	in	an	open,	transcribed	public	hearing.”	Id.		
21.	 Stone,	supra	note	2,	at	427.	





also	 been	 a	 few	 failed	 nominations—notably	 Douglas	 Ginsburg	 and	 Harriet	 Miers—where	 the	
nomination	was	withdrawn	before	a	hearing	could	be	held.	These	nominations	are	not	considered	
in	this	Article.	
24. These	 nominees	 were	 O’Connor,	 Scalia,	 Rehnquist,	 when	 nominated	 for	 Chief	 Justice,	
Roberts,	and	Alito.	Note,	then,	that	we	have	no	examples	of	Democratic	nominees	being	nominat‐
ed	to	a	Republican	Senate.	See	Stone,	supra	note	2,	at	386.	




Court	of	 the	United	States	Before	 the	S.	Comm.	on	 the	 Judiciary,	 90th	Cong.	1‐27,	48‐74,	86‐100,	
155‐80,	187‐98	(1967)	(questioning	by	Senators	James	O.	Eastland,	John	J.	McClellan,	and	Sam	J.	
Ervin,	all	Democrats,	as	well	as	by	Strom	Thurmond,	who	was,	by	then,	a	Republican).		
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hearing,	 almost	 every	 committee	member	has	 asked	questions	of	 the	
nominee.27	 (Probably	 not	 coincidentally,	 Justice	 O’Connor’s	 hearing	
was	the	 first	 to	be	 televised.28)	And	since	 Justice	Souter’s	nomination	
in	1990,	every	senator	on	the	committee	has	taken	a	turn–or	several–
asking	questions	of	every	nominee.29	
It	 is	 conventional	 wisdom	 that	 the	 failed	 nomination	 of	 Robert	
Bork	 in	 1987	 marked	 a	 turning	 point	 in	 confirmation	 hearings,	 alt‐
hough	the	conventional	wisdom	is	not	always	consistent	on	the	nature	
of	 the	 change.	After	Bork,	 some	argue,	 confirmation	hearings	became	





atively	extreme)	views	about	 the	 law,	and	because	 that	candor	 led	 to	
his	 defeat,	 subsequent	 nominees	 have	 become	 increasingly	 less	 can‐
did.32	
Recent	empirical	research	complicates	these	claims.	In	one	study,	
Lori	 Ringhand	 and	 Paul	 Collins	 found	 that	 nominees	 have	 long	 been	
asked	substantive	questions	about	legal	matters,	especially	civil	rights,	
and	judicial	philosophy.33	At	the	same	time,	they	found	that	there	has	
been	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 proportion	 of	 substantive	questions	 asked	 at	
confirmation	hearings,	but	they	date	the	beginning	of	that	trend	to	the	
27.	 Beginning	 with	 Justice	 O’Connor’s	 hearing,	 every	 Republican	 on	 the	 committee	 asked






ing	 the	hearings	of	 course	provides	senators	a	chance	 to	perform	 for	 their	constituents	and	 for	
various	interest	groups.	Comiskey,	supra	note	28at	28	(citing	TWENTIETH	CENTURY	FUND	TASK	FORCE
ON	 JUDICIAL	 SELECTION,	 JUDICIAL	ROULETTE:	REPORT	OF	 THE	TWENTIETH	CENTURY	 FUND	TASK	 FORCE	 ON	
JUDICIAL	 SELECTION	 9‐10	 (1988)	 (discussing	 increased	 senatorial	 attention	 to	 the	 hearings	 after	
they	 began	 being	 broadcast	 on	 television));	 Stone,	 supra,	 note	 2,	 at	 450‐52	 (discussing	 the	 in‐
creasing	 importance	 of	 interest	 groups	 in	 the	 confirmation	 process	 and	 noting	 that	 a	 “senator	
who	ignores	these	groups	does	so	at	his	peril.”).		




33.	 Ringhand	 &	 Collins,	 supra	note	 20,	 at	 598‐99.	 This	 finding	 is	 consistent	with	my	 own	
review	of	hearing	transcripts.	Some	nominees,	however,	were	asked	virtually	no	such	questions,	
while	today	such	a	situation	would	be	unthinkable.	
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early	 1970s34–years	 before	 Bork’s	 1987	 nomination.	 Moreover,	 they	
date	 the	 significant	 increase	 in	 the	 total	number	of	questions	 in	each	
hearing	asked	to	Rehnquist’s	1986	hearings	to	become	Chief	Justice.35	
In	 another	 set	 of	 studies,	 Dion	 Farganis	 and	 Justin	 Wedeking	
found	 that	post‐Bork,	 there	was	only	a	modest	 change	 in	 the	willing‐
ness	of	nominees	to	respond	forthrightly	to	questions	about	civil	rights	





Wedeking	 and	 Farganis	 also	 note	 that	 because	 there	 are	 now	




questions	 they	 answer,	 because	 the	 absolute	 number	 of	 refusals	 has	
increased,	observers	may	experience	 the	nominees	as	being	 less	can‐
did.	Overall,	however,	as	Geoffrey	Stone	puts	it	in	his	study	of	the	con‐
firmation	 process,	 “Bork’s	 candor	.	.	.	 marked,	 not	 a	 critical	 turning	








casts,	 No	 Previews:	 Analyzing	 Supreme	 Court	 Nominee	 Evasiveness,	 1955‐2009	 at	 2	 (June	 22,	
2010)	(unpublished	manuscript),	available	at		
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1628813	 (hereinafter,	 No	 Hints	 I);	 Dion	
Farganis	&	Justin	Wedeking,	Kagan’s	Candor:	Updated	Findings	from	the	Recent	Supreme	Court	
Confirmation	 Hearings	 (July	 6,	 2010)	 (unpublished	 manuscript),	 available	 at	
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1635240	 (hereinafter	 Kagan’s	 Candor)).	












that	 confirmation	 hearings	 have	 long	 included	 discussions	 of	 im‐






The	 question	 of	 how	 nominees	 describe	 the	 role	 of	 the	 judge	 is	
particularly	 salient	 in	 light	 of	 claims	 made	 by	 the	 four	 most	 recent	
nominees	 to	 the	 Supreme	 Court:	 Chief	 Justice	 Roberts,	 and	 Justices	
Alito,	 Sotomayor,	 and	 Kagan.	 Many	 cases	 decided	 by	 the	 Supreme	
Court	 involve	 difficult	 questions	 to	which	 there	 are	 not	 objective	 an‐
swers.41	Despite	 this	 reality,	 in	 these	most	 recent	 confirmation	hear‐
ings,	the	nominees	have,	at	least	sometimes,	described	their	approach	
to	 judging	 as	 if	 by	 looking	 closely	 at	 case	 facts	 and	 legal	materials,	 a	
logically	deducible–objective,	neutral–resolution	would	emerge.	Justice	























42.	 See	 Confirmation	 Hearing,	 Sotomayor,	 supra	 note	 5,	 at	 437	 (response	 of	 J.	 Sonia	 So‐
tomayor	to	Sen.	Arlen	Specter,	S.	Comm.	on	the	Judiciary).	
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You	certainly	would	look	to	precedent,	which	is	an	objective	factor,	
and	most	of	 the	 issues	 that	 come	up	 in	 constitutional	 law	now	 fall	
within	an	area	in	which	there	is	a	rich	and	often	very	complex	body	





Most	 famously,	 when	 Chief	 Justice	 Roberts	 made	 claims	 of	 con‐
straint	and	objectivity	at	his	confirmation	hearing,	he	returned	repeat‐
edly	 to	 his	 umpire	 metaphor,	 and	 like	 the	 other	 three	 post‐2000	
nominees,	he	also	invoked	the	legal	sources	he	claimed	he	would	rely	
on	exclusively:	





the	 Constitution.	 They	 are	 constrained	 by	 the	 precedents	 of	 other	
judges	that	become	part	of	the	rule	of	law	that	they	must	apply.44	
Justice	 Kagan’s	 description	 of	 the	 judicial	 process	 was	 the	most	
complex	of	 the	 four.	On	 the	one	hand,	she	repeatedly	returned	 to	 the	
expression	 “it’s	 law	 all	 the	 way	 down”45	 to	 describe	 the	 proper	 ap‐
proach	 to	 judicial	 decision‐making,	 implying	 that	 the	 law	 alone	 can	
provide	the	answers	to	the	questions	put	to	the	Supreme	Court.	On	the	
other	hand,	she	did	acknowledge	 that	 there	are	sometimes	clashes	of	






















sides	 and	 cast	 each	 argument	 in	 the	 best	 possible	 light,	 but	 some‐
times	they	are	not	going	to	agree.46	
The	post‐2000	nominees’	insistence	on	neutrality	is,	in	one	sense,	
neither	 surprising	 nor	 novel.	 Supreme	 Court	 nominees	 have	 long	 in‐
sisted	that	 their	 “personal	predilections”	have	no	place	 in	 the	 judicial	
enterprise,47	that	their	job	is	solely	to	enforce	and	apply	the	law,48	and	
that	they	would	not	approach	the	judicial	enterprise	with	any	particu‐
lar	 agenda	 or	 set	 of	 biases.49	 Indeed,	 such	 assurances	 are	 not	 only	
commonplace,	but	also	appropriate.	We	legitimately	expect	our	justic‐
es	 to	 approach	 cases	 dispassionately,	 with	 open	minds,	 and	 without	
bias	towards	or	against	any	parties.	Nonetheless,	the	ubiquity	of	these	






Is	 this	 emphasis	 on	 neutrality	 or	 objectivity	 new,	 or	 at	 least	
heightened,	 relative	 to	 historical	 experience?50	 Under	 what	 circum‐
46.	 Id.	at	203	(response	of	Elena	Kagan	to	Sen.	Amy	Klobuchar,	S.	Comm.	on	the	Judiciary).	
47.	 See,	e.g.,	Nomination	of	 John	Marshall	Harlan,	of	New	York,	 to	be	Associate	 Justice	of	 the






the	United	 States	Before	 the	 S.	 Comm.	 on	 the	 Judiciary,	 100th	 Cong.	 139	 (1987)	 (response	 of	 J.	
Anthony	M.	Kennedy	to	Sen.	Charles	Grassley,	S.	Comm.	on	the	Judiciary).	








cantly	 more	 conservative.	 “So	 dramatic	 a	 change	 in	 the	 Court’s	 ideology	.	.	.	 would	 naturally	
heighten	the	attentiveness	of	senators	to	the	potential	changes	in	the	membership	of	the	Court.”	
Id.	at	447‐48.	(2)	Bush	v.	Gore,	decided	in	2000,	“undoubtedly	highlighted	the	ideological	inclina‐
tions	 of	 the	 Justices	 in	 both	 the	 public	 and	 political	 consciousness.”	 Id.	 at	 448.	 (3)	 Television,	
internet,	and	other	saturated	media	coverage	brings	all	of	the	details	of	confirmation	hearings	and	
nomination	 politics	 to	 the	 American	 people.	 Id.	 at	 449.	 (4)	 Interest	 group	 involvement	 in	 the	
confirmation	process	has	become	“increasingly	aggressive.”	Id.	at	450.	(5)	American	politics	have	
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stances	do	nominees	make	such	claims	and	under	what	circumstances	
do	 they	 acknowledge	 a	 legitimate	 role	 for	 what	 Justice	 Kagan	 called	
“judgment?”	To	 investigate	 these	questions,	 I	 recruited	a	 team	of	 law	














covering	 all	 30	 hearings	 from	1955	 through	 2010.54	 For	 purposes	 of	
this	 Article,	 I	 collapsed	 the	 data	 still	 further,	 looking	 at	 each	 unique	
senator‐nominee	pair,	of	which	there	were	332.	As	between	the	pairs,	I	
wanted	 to	 determine	 under	 what	 circumstances	 it	 was	 likely	 that	 a	
nominee	 would	 claim	 neutrality	 or	 objectivity	 in	 judging	 and	 under	
become	increasingly	polarized.	Id.	at	452	(citing	Richard	H.	Pildes,	Why	the	Center	Does	Not	Hold:	
The	Causes	of	Hyperpolarization	in	American	Democracy,	98	CAL.	L.	REV.	273,	277	(2010)).		










dom	 sample	 of	 rounds	 from	 other	 students’	 assignments	 for	 purposes	 of	 trying	 to	 establish	 a	
reliability	baseline.	(The	sample	was	not	quite	random	because	it	was	drawn	from	a	dataset	that	
had	 one	 omission,	 as	well	 as	 some	mis‐numbering,	which	 resulted	 in	 an	 overrepresentation	 of	
Roberts’	rounds.	The	sample	was	drawn	using	Stata12.)	For	identifying	when	nominees	claimed	
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what	circumstances	it	was	likely	that	the	nominee	would	acknowledge	
that	 subjectivity	 inevitably–and	perhaps	 even	desirably–has	 a	 role	 in	
judging.	
I	 began	 by	 considering	whether	 there	were	 differences	 between	
Democratic	and	Republican	nominees.	Simple	t‐tests55	established	that	
Democratic	 nominees	 are	 nearly	 twice	 as	 likely	 (.41)	 to	mention	 the	
role	of	judgment	or	subjectivity	in	colloquy	with	any	particular	Senator	
than	are	Republican	nominees	(.23).56	On	the	other	hand,	I	did	not	find	
statistically	 significant	 differences	 between	 Democratic	 and	 Republi‐
can	nominees’	 likelihood	of	 describing	 the	 judicial	 role	 as	 neutral.	 In	
fact	those	rates	were	virtually	identical.57	
To	investigate	the	data	further,	I	ran	probit	regressions58	to	try	to	
identify	 the	 circumstances	 under	 which	 we	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 see	
claims	of	neutrality	or	admissions	of	subjectivity.59	In	addition	to	con‐
sidering	 the	 party	 of	 the	 nominating	 president,	 I	 considered	 the	per‐
ceived	 ideology	 of	 the	 nominee	 at	 the	 time.60	 I	 also	 thought	 that	 the	
party	 of	 the	 senator	 asking	 the	 questions	 might	 matter,	 as	 well	 as	
whether	 that	 senator	 was	 of	 the	 opposing	 party	 to	 the	 president.61	
Likewise,	 it	 seemed	 to	 me	 that	 with	 respect	 to	 any	 given	 sena‐
tor/nominee	pair,	 a	nominee	was	more	 likely	 to	make	claims	of	neu‐











60.	 To	account	 for	perceived	 ideology	of	 the	nominees,	 I	 used	 the	Segal‐Cover	 scores.	The
Segal‐Cover	score	codes	 the	perceived	 liberalism	of	each	nominee	at	 the	 time	of	nomination	by	






and	second	dimensions	of	 the	DW‐NOMINATE	scores).	See	Royce	Carroll,	 et	 al.,	DW‐NOMINATE	
Scores	 with	 Bootstrapped	 Standard	 Errors,	 (February	 3,	 2011),	
http://voteview.com/dwnomin.htm.	 Because	 the	 early	 hearings	 were	 dominated	 by	 Southern	
Democrat	segregationists	and	because	the	second	dimension	of	the	DW‐NOMINATE	scores	focus‐
es	on	matters	of	civil	 rights	and	equality	as	opposed	to	“government	 intervention	 in	 the	econo‐
my.	.	.	,”	id.,	I	thought	they	might	give	different	results	than	party	of	the	senator.	I	did	not	find	any	
statistically	significant	effect	in	using	these	scores,	however.	
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(and	 vice	 versa).	 In	 other	words,	 those	 two	 types	 of	 claims	might	 go	
hand‐in‐hand	 as	 nominees	 attempt	 to	 explain	 the	 delicate	 balance	 of	
discretion	 and	 constraint	 that	makes	 up	 the	 judicial	 task.	 Finally,	 be‐
cause	the	number	of	rounds	of	questioning	and	the	numbers	of	sena‐
tors	asking	questions	vary	significantly	from	nominee	to	nominee	but	
have	overall	 increased	steadily	over	 time,	 I	 ran	 the	 regressions	 sepa‐
rately	using	two	different	variables:	(1)	the	number	of	rounds	of	ques‐
tioning	 per	 senator/nominee	 pair,	 reasoning	 that	 as	 hearings	 get	
longer,	 there	are	more	opportunities	 for	nominees	 to	 say	all	 kinds	of	
things,	and	(2)	time.62	And	another	time‐related	measure,	I	calculated	
how	 close	 each	 hearing	 was	 to	 the	 next	 presidential	 election,	 as	 it	











(d)	 when	 the	 nominee	 also	 acknowledges	 a	 role	 for	 judg‐
ment/subjectivity	in	colloquy	with	the	same	Senator.	








63.	 See	 Stone,	 supra	 note	 2,	 at	 386‐87	 (discussing	 conservative	 Republican	 and	 southern
Democratic	opposition	to	Fortas’	nomination	to	Chief	 Justice)	(“[T]he	coalition	.	.	.	had	an	 incen‐
tive	 to	 block	 Johnson’s	.	.	.	 nomination	.	.	.	 less	 than	 five	 months	 before	 the	 1968	 presidential	
election,	 which	 the	 Republicans	 fully	 expected	 to	 win.”);	 id.	 at	 414	 n.56	 (noting	 that	 “in	 all	 of	
American	 history,	 presidents	 have	 made	 only	 eight	 Supreme	 Court	 nominations	 within	 six	
months	of	a	presidential	election”).		
64. 	This	 finding	 should	 be	 interpreted	 with	 some	 caution	 due	 to	 possible	 endogeneity.
Because	 the	Segal‐Cover	 scores	 rely	on	newspaper	 editorial	descriptions	of	 the	nominee,	 those	
editorials	 could	 themselves	 be	 responding	 to	 things	 the	 nominee	 said	 during	 the	 confirmation	
hearings.	Interestingly,	the	party	of	the	nominating	president	was	not	statistically	significant.	
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(c)	 the	nominee	makes	claims	of	neutrality	or	objectivity	 in	 collo‐
quy	with	the	same	Senator.65	
All	of	 these	results	are	significant	at	p>.05.	Proximity	 to	 the	next	
presidential	election	was	not	statistically	significant.	
III. 	IMPLICATIONS	AND	FUTURE	RESEARCH
These	 results	 are	 suggestive	 in	 many	 ways	 and	 raise	 numerous	
questions.	Perhaps	of	most	interest,	however,	is	the	fact	that	claims	of	
objectivity	or	neutrality	do	 in	 fact	appear	to	be	 increasingly	 likely	as‐
pects	 of	 confirmation	 hearings	 over	 time.	Moreover,	 such	 claims	 are	
particularly	 likely	when	 the	nominee	 is	 speaking	 to	 a	member	of	 the	
opposing	 party.	 In	 our	 currently	 highly	 polarized	 political	 environ‐
ment,66	 it	 is	hardly	surprising	 that	nominees	are	more	 likely	 to	claim	
neutrality	or	objectivity	in	their	confirmation	hearings	in	order	to	not	
become	 targets	 of	 the	 opposing	 party;	 nor	 is	 it	 surprising	 that	 such	
claims	are	more	likely	the	more	recent	the	hearing.	Indeed,	at	least	for	
a	nominee	facing	an	opposition‐led	Senate	or	an	opposition‐led	filibus‐




might	 have	 deleterious	 effects	 on	 the	 Supreme	 Court’s	 standing	 and	




nominees,	however,	sometimes	 imply	that	 judges	do	the	opposite:	 in‐
stead	 of	weighing	 different	 perspectives,	 they	 rely	 on	 legal	materials	
and	 deductive	 logic	 to	 reach	 the	 objectively	 correct	 answer.	 These	
claims,	rather	than	enhance	legitimacy,	may	exacerbate	alienation	and	
disappointment	 among	 those	unhappy	with	decisions	of	 the	Court	 or	
with	the	votes	of	individual	justices.	
To	explain	why	requires	some	discussion	of	what	several	theorists	
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influences	the	way	people	evaluate	empirical	evidence	in	legally	salient	





conduct,	 individuals’	 responses	 varied	predictably	 and	 systematically	
based	on	those	values	and	affiliations	on	the	one	hand,	and	on	the	oth‐
er	 hand,	 whether	 they	 were	 told	 that	 the	 protest	 involved	 abortion	
protesters	outside	a	clinic	or	gay	rights	protesters	objecting	 to	 “don’t	
ask	don’t	 tell”	 outside	 a	 college	placement	 facility	where	 the	military	
was	interviewing	students.70	People’s	perceptions	of	the	protests	were	
often	tied	to	their	sympathies	for	or	against	the	protesters.	




with.	 This	 phenomenon	 is	 called	 “naïve	 realism”	 because	 people	 are	
realistic	when	it	comes	to	the	way	others’	thoughts	and	conclusions	are	
influenced	 by	 their	 values	 and	 commitments,	 but	 naïve	 about	 them‐
selves.71	As	a	 result,	people	believe	 that	 they	 themselves	are	 fair	and	
neutral,	but	they	often	fail	to	credit	the	good	faith	of	those	with	whom	
they	disagree.72	This	feature	of	cultural	cognition	can	cause	or	exacer‐
bate	 social	 division	 as	 people	 on	 either	 side	 of	 an	 issue	 believe	 that	
their	 opponents	 (and	 only	 their	 opponents)	 are	 acting	 out	 of	 illegiti‐
mate	partisanship.73	
In	his	recent	Harvard	Law	Review	Foreword,	Dan	Kahan	explores	






















versial	 and	 high‐profile	 issues–abortion	 or	 affirmative	 action,	 for	 ex‐
ample–these	 reactions	 carry	 with	 them	 the	 threat	 of	 de‐legitimizing	
the	Court	in	the	public’s	eyes	because	it	(or	at	least	those	justices	with	
whom	the	citizen	disagrees)	 is	acting	 ideologically,	not	based	on	 law.	
And	such	views	of	the	Court	are	not	uncommon.	In	a	poll	taken	before	
the	Court	announced	its	ruling	upholding	the	Affordable	Care	Act,75	for	
example,	 “a	majority	 of	 respondents	 expressed	 concern	 that	 ‘the	 Su‐
preme	Court	makes	decisions	based	on	a	political	agenda	instead	of	the	
law,’	with	only	eleven	percent	of	respondents	expressing	‘a	great	deal	
of	 confidence	 that	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 puts	 politics	 aside	 and	makes	
decisions	 based	 on	 the	 law.’”76	 This	 view	 is	 not	 conducive	 to	 public	
support	and	respect	for	life‐tenured,	unelected	justices	or	for	the	Court	
on	which	they	sit.	
Intriguingly	 and	 counter‐intuitively,	 Kahan	 argues	 that	 the	 neu‐
tral,	 authoritative	 voice	 of	 the	 classic	 judicial	 opinion	 itself	may	 con‐
tribute	to	public	perception	that	the	Court	is	deciding	cases	“based	on	a	
political	agenda	 instead	of	 law”77	or	that	the	 justices	are	“fitting	their	
rulings	 to	 their	partisan	views.”78	When	people	disagree	with	an	out‐
come,	 that	neutral	 voice,	 rather	 than	 assuring	 them	 that	 the	 result	 is	
objectively	 correct,	 instead	 can	 contribute	 to	 a	 perception	 that	 the	
Court	 considered	only	one	 side	and	 that	other	perspectives	were	not	
even	considered.79	
As	 a	 result,	 Kahan	 argues,	 the	 justices	would	 do	 better	 to	write	
opinions	 that	 explicitly	 acknowledge	 the	 complexity	 and	 value‐laden	
nature	of	many	of	the	decisions	they	must	make	and	that	acknowledge	
that	 law	and	legal	reasoning	alone	may	not	provide	a	path	to	a	single	
“right”	 answer.80	 Explicit	 judicial	 recognition	 of	 the	 inherently	 inde‐
terminate	 nature	 of	 many	 of	 the	 issues	 confronted	 by	 the	 Court—a	
75.	 	Nat’l	Fed’n	of	Indep.	Bus.	v.	Sebelius,	132	S.	Ct.	2566	(2012).	
76.	 	Karlan,	 supra	 note	 15,	 at	 7	 n.34	 (quoting	 Memorandum	 from	 Geoff	 Garin	 et	 al.,	 Hart	
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kind	 of	 complexity	 that	 Kahan	 calls	 aporia81—would	 not	 of	 course	
erase	social	divisions	and	disagreements.	But	such	recognition	might,	
he	argues,	allow	those	on	the	losing	side	to	feel	that	their	position	was	
considered—and	it	might	therefore	actually	 increase	 the	Court’s	 legit‐
imacy	with	the	citizenry.82	
As	 other	 members	 of	 the	 Symposium	 have	 illustrated,	 experi‐
ments	 on	 people’s	 reactions	 to	 hypothetical	 judicial	 decisions	 they	
disagree	with	provide	empirical	support	for	Kahan’s	theory.	Tom	Tyler	
and	Margaret	 Krochik	 find	 that	 individuals	 are	more	 likely	 to	 accept	
policy	outcomes	they	disagree	with	when	they	believe,	 inter	alia,	that	
their	 concerns	 or	 values	 have	 been	 given	 due	 consideration.83	 Dan	
Simon	and	Nicholas	Scurich	likewise	find	that	among	people	who	disa‐
gree	 with	 the	 outcome	 in	 hypothetical	 judicial	 decisions,	 “decisions	
accompanied	by	monolithic	reasoning	received	lower	evaluations	than	
decisions	that	provided	good	reasons	for	both	sides	of	the	dispute.	 In	








voice	may	 trigger	naïve	realism	and	 its	consequent	social	division,	 so	
too	 might	 confirmation	 hearings’	 repeated	 invocations	 of	 neutrality	
and	disavowals	 of	 ideology	or	 subjectivity	 in	 judging.	The	disconnect	
between	these	claims	and	the	reality	of	what	people	observe	once	de‐
cisions	are	made	might	worsen	what	Kahan	calls	the	Court’s	“neutrali‐
ty	 crisis.”85	 And	 recent	 hearings	 may	 increase	 this	 danger.	 Although	







84.	 Dan	 Simon	 and	 Nicholas	 Scurich,	 Judicial	 Overstating,	 88	 CHI.‐KENT	 L.	 REV.	 411,	 429
(2013).	
85.	 Kahan	uses	 the	 term	 throughout	his	Harvard	Law	Review	Foreword.	Kahan,	Foreword,
supra	note	72.	(Whether	the	Court	currently	faces	a	“crisis”	is	of	course	debatable,	but	the	condi‐
tions	that	Kahan	argues	may	cause	such	a	crisis	are	indeed	present.)		
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To	be	clear,	I	do	not	mean	to	suggest	that	any	particular	statement	
in	 a	 confirmation	hearing	 or	 even	 any	particular	 hearing	have	 led	 or	
will	 lead	 to	 a	 “neutrality	 crisis.”	 Any	 effect	 that	 confirmation	hearing	
rhetoric	might	have	on	public	views	of	the	Court	is	greatly	attenuated.	
Nonetheless,	 confirmation	 hearings	 are	 virtually	 the	 only	 time	 that	
ordinary	people	are	likely	to	pay	much	attention	to	the	way	judges	and	
justices	 describe	 their	 work	 and	 the	 work	 of	 the	 court,	 whether	 by	
watching	or	listening	to	the	hearings	themselves	or	by	following	media	
accounts.	In	fact,	surprising	numbers	of	people	apparently	do	so.86	The	
hearings	 thus	 can	 have	 a	 significant	 educative	 function.87	 Moreover,	
the	 rhetoric	 and	 themes	 of	 the	 hearings	 likely	 work	 their	 way	 into	
mainstream	 discussions	 of	 the	 Court	 and	 its	 work.	 Future	 research	
might	well	 investigate	 this	 aspect	 of	media	 coverage	 of	 confirmation	
hearings.	
Subject	 to	 this	 caveat,	my	 finding	 that	Democratic	 nominees	 are	
about	 twice	 as	 likely	 to	make	admissions	of	 subjectivity	 than	are	Re‐
publican	 nominees	 gives	 rise	 to	 an	 additional,	 related	 concern.	 How	
might	these	differences	in	the	way	nominees	of	different	parties	have	
described	the	role	of	judges	affect	the	way	that	people	of	different	po‐
litical	 orientations	 themselves	 think	 about	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Court	 and,	
ultimately,	to	the	Court’s	own	legitimacy?	As	Tyler	and	Simon/Scurich	
suggest,	 admissions	 of	 aporia	might	 increase	 people’s	 acceptance	 of	
decisions	they	disagree	with.	But	for	those	who	tend	to	agree	with	Re‐
publican	nominees,	does	the	same	dynamic	operate	when	the	authori‐
ties	 on	 “their	 side”	 do	 not	 reinforce	 those	 admissions?	 Likewise,	 for	
those	 sympathetic	 to	 Democratic	 nominees,	 if	 the	 authorities	 they	
agree	 with	 admit	 to	 subjectivity	 but	 the	 other	 side	 does	 not,	 is	 that	
likely	 to	 heighten	 a	 belief	 that	 those	 on	 the	 other	 side	 acting	 in	 bad	
faith?	That	nominees	are	more	likely	to	make	their	claims	of	neutrality	
when	 talking	 to	 senators	 of	 the	 opposing	 party	 heighten	 any	 effect?	
More	research	is	needed	to	tease	out	some	of	these	dynamics.	
The	wealth	of	data	provided	by	coding	the	confirmation	hearings	
also	 provides	 the	 opportunity	 to	 investigate	 the	 role	 of	 a	 variety	 of	





87.	 	See	 Stone,	 supra	 note	 2,	 at	 466	 (arguing	 that	 the	 educative	 function	 of	 the	 hearings
should	be	“paramount”).	
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text	of	particular	areas	of	law	or	controversial	legal	issues,	such	as	the	
right	 to	privacy	or	 the	 rights	of	 criminal	defendants,	 or	do	 these	dis‐
cussions	tend	to	occur	in	the	abstract?	Does	the	increasing	polarization	
of	our	political	 culture	have	consequences	 for	 the	ways	 that	 senators	
and	 nominees	 alike	 discuss	 the	 judicial	 role?	 These	 and	 other	 ques‐
tions	provide	rich	terrain	for	future	work.	
CONCLUSION	
In	 this	 paper,	 I	 present	 some	 preliminary	 analysis	 of	 nominees’	




inees,	 in	particular	more	 liberal	nominees,	while	 they	 certainly	make	
claims	 of	 neutrality,	 they	 also	 acknowledge	 that	 judging	 in	 fact	 also	
involves	making	judgments,	judgments	that	are	necessarily	subjective.	
These	disparities,	as	well	as	other	features	of	the	confirmation	process,	
coupled	with	 the	 insights	of	cultural	cognition	researchers,	raise	con‐
cerns	about	the	longterm	effect	on	public	attitudes	towards	the	Court,	
particularly	on	people’s	willingness	to	accept	Supreme	Court	decisions	
with	which	they	strongly	disagree.	
